22 August 2011
FAA Bans ex-FAA Aircraft Safety Inspector Hires
[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 162 (Monday, August 22, 2011)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 52231-52237]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-21315]
———————————————————————–
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 91, 119, 125, 133, 137, 141, 142, 145, and 147
[Docket No. FAA-2008-1154; Amendment Nos. 91-325, 119-5, 125-61, 133-
14, 137-16, 141-16, 142-8, 145-29, and 147-7]
RIN 2120-AJ36
Restrictions on Operators Employing Former Flight Standards
Service Aviation Safety Inspectors
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
———————————————————————–
SUMMARY: This rule will prohibit any person holding a certificate from
knowingly employing, or making a contractual arrangement with, certain
individuals to act as an agent or a representative of the certificate
holder in any matter before the FAA under certain conditions. These
restrictions will apply if the individual, in the preceding 2-year
period directly served as, or was directly responsible for the
oversight of, a Flight Standards Service Aviation Safety Inspector, and
had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection of, the
operations of the certificate holder. This rule will also apply to
persons who own or manage fractional ownership program aircraft that
are used to conduct operations under specific regulations described in
this document. This rule will establish these restrictions to prevent
potential organizational conflicts of interest which could adversely
affect aviation safety.
DATES: Effective Date: This amendment becomes effective October 21,
2011.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this final rule, contact Nancy Lauck Claussen, Federal Aviation
Administration, Air Transportation Division, AFS-200, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-8166; e-mail
NancyLClaussen@faa.gov. For legal questions concerning this final
rule, contact Paul G. Greer, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of
the Chief Counsel, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone 202-267-3073; e-mail PaulGGreer@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAAs authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator, to include the authority to
issue, rescind, and revise regulations. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agencys authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, chapter 447, Safety Regulation. Under section
44701(a) the FAA is charged with promoting the safe flight of civil
aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations and minimum
standards for other practices, methods, and procedures necessary for
safety in air commerce and national security.
I. Background
On March 5, 2008, the FAA proposed a $10.2 million civil penalty
against a major airline for operating 46 airplanes without performing
mandatory inspections for fuselage fatigue cracking. The FAA alleged
that the airline operated 46 Boeing 737 airplanes on almost 60,000
flights from June 2006 to March 2007 while failing to comply with an
existing FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) that required repetitive
inspections of certain fuselage areas to detect fatigue cracking.
Based on this event, on June 30, 2008, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Office of Inspector General issued a report on its
review of the FAAs oversight of airlines and use of regulatory
partnership programs. The report concluded that the FAA Certificate
Management Office (CMO) overseeing the airline that failed to perform
the required inspections had developed an overly collaborative
relationship with the airline. The report recommended that the FAA
should enhance management controls by implementing post-employment
guidance that includes a “cooling-off period to prohibit an air
carrier from hiring an FAA Flight Standards Service Aviation Safety
Inspector (AFS ASI) who previously inspected that air carrier from
acting in any type of liaison capacity between it and the FAA. A full
copy of the report is contained in the docket for this rulemaking.
On September 2, 2008, an independent review team, appointed by
former Secretary of Transportation Mary E. Peters on May 1, 2008 to
examine the FAAs safety culture and its implementation of safety
management systems, issued its report titled, “Managing Risks in Civil
Aviation: A Review of the FAAs Approach to Safety. The report stated
that “[t]he FAA, like all other regulators, faces the danger of
regulatory capture. Capture occurs when a regulatory agency draws so
close to those with whom it deals on a daily basis (ie the regulated)
that the agency ends up elevating their concerns at the expense of the
agencys core mission. A full copy of the report may be found in the
docket for this rulemaking.
A. Summary of the NPRM
The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on November 20, 2009
(74 FR 60218) and the comment period closed on February 18, 2010. The
NPRM proposed to prohibit any person holding a certificate to conduct
operations under parts 121, 125, 133, 135, 137, 141, 142, 145 or 147
from knowingly employing, or making a contractual arrangement with,
certain individuals to act as an agent or a representative of the
certificate holder in any matter before the FAA under certain
conditions. These restrictions would apply if the individual, in the
preceding 2-year period: (1) Directly served as, or was directly
responsible for the oversight of, an AFS ASI; and (2) had direct
responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection of, the operations
of the certificate holder. The NPRM also proposed to apply to persons
who own or manage fractional ownership program aircraft that are used
to conduct operations under subpart K of part 91. The FAA proposed to
establish these restrictions to prevent potential organizational
conflicts of interest which could adversely affect aviation safety.
B. Discussion of the Comments
The FAA received five comments on the proposed rule, all from
individual commenters. The FAA did not receive comments from airlines,
trade associations, or labor organizations. The three adverse comments
addressed the applicability of the rule, and the potential burdens the
rule could create. Two comments expressed support for the rule.
Commenters also suggested changes, as discussed more fully in this
section.
1. Applicability of Employment Prohibition to Additional FAA Employees
Two individual commenters stated that the provisions in the
proposed rule should be expanded to include FAA
[[Page 52232]]
regional and headquarters personnel. They commented that individuals in
regional and headquarters positions exert power and influence and
should also be covered by the provisions in the rule. Another
individual noted the challenge of trying to regulate integrity and
that, using the same justification as stated in the NPRM, all former
FAA employees should never be allowed to become FAA Designees, such as
Designated Engineering Representatives, Designated Airworthiness
Representatives, Designated Manufacturing Inspection Representatives,
Organizational Designated Airworthiness Representatives.
In the final rule, the FAA has limited the scope of employment
restrictions to certain types of operations. The restrictions will
apply to those persons conducting operations under parts 121, 125, 133,
135, 137, 141, 142, 145, 147, and subpart K of part 91 employing former
FAA personnel who had oversight responsibilities for the operator [eg
Office Managers, Assistant Office Managers, Branch Managers, Unit
Supervisors, and Aviation Safety Inspectors assigned to a Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO) or a CMO]. AFS ASIs directly engaged
in certificate management typically develop close working relationships
with other AFS ASIs with whom they share direct oversight
responsibilities for a particular operator. The FAA believes that
aviation safety could be compromised if a former AFS ASI, acting on
behalf of the operator, is able to exert undue influence on current FAA
employees with whom he or she had established close working
relationships while working at a FSDO or a CMO.
In the final rule the FAA has not extended the restrictions to the
employment of all former FAA regional and headquarters personnel.
However, these individuals are not without restrictions regarding post-
FAA employment, as there are currently restrictions that apply to FAA
managers and executives. Section 207(a)(1) of Title 18, United States
Code (18 USC.) generally places a permanent restriction on former
executive branch employees (including FAA employees) regarding their
ability to represent a person in connection with a particular matter in
which the United States government has a direct and substantial
interest and in which that person participated personally and
substantially.
The FAA has determined that the scope of the restrictions in the
final rule is appropriate. FAA employees not directly engaged in
certificate management typically do not develop those close working
relationships that the agency believes would necessitate the imposition
of post-employment restrictions on certificate holders set forth in
this final rule. Operators can still employ former AFS ASIs in numerous
positions. However, these former AFS ASIs may not represent the
operator in any matter before the FAA if in the preceding 2-year period
that person (1) directly served as, or was directly responsible for the
oversight of an AFS ASI, and (2) had direct responsibility to inspect,
or oversee the inspection of that operator.
Although a commenter stated that the rule should impose
restrictions that would prohibit former FAA employees from becoming
designees, FAA designees do not represent the interest of certificate
holders, but rather serve as representatives of the Administrator.
Additionally, the NPRM did not propose the establishment of such
restrictions and the agency considers the comments to be outside the
scope of the notice.
2. Burden on Former AFS Employees
One commenter stated that the provisions in the proposed rule
create a hardship for FAA employees who are leaving the agency, and
suggested that the restriction on employment be reduced to 6 months,
instead of the proposed 2 years. The same commenter also suggested that
the restriction not be applied to anyone who was fired or has retired,
and also suggested that the restriction be limited to part 121
operators since the FAA has no data indicating that this action is
warranted for certificate holders engaged in activities under other
parts.
The FAA selected a 2-year period for the duration of this
restriction. This regulation will mirror a corresponding requirement
found in current AFS policy which provides for a 2-year “cooling off
period for newly employed AFS ASIs. This AFS policy prohibits new ASIs
from having certificate management responsibilities for their former
aviation employer during this 2-year period. The final rule will not
change this longstanding FAA policy. It will, however, create a
corresponding requirement applicable to operators who seek to employ
certain former FAA AFS ASIs and those responsible for their oversight.
In response to the comment that the restriction not be applied to
anyone who was fired or has retired, the FAA notes that the method by
which an AFS ASIs employment is terminated does not have any bearing
on potential conflicts of interest. Therefore, the restrictions apply
regardless of the manner by which the AFS ASI terminates his or her
employment with the agency.
In response to the comment that the provisions in the rule should
be limited to part 121 certificate holders the FAA notes that close
working relationships leading to potential conflicts of interest can
occur regardless of the type of operation being conducted. Therefore,
the FAA has determined these restrictions should apply to those persons
conducting operations under parts 121, 125, 133, 135, 137, 141, 142,
145, and subpart K of part 91.
3. Necessity for Proposed Restrictions
Two commenters stated that the proposed rule is necessary. One
individual commented that a former AFS ASI should not be able to work
directly for the companies that were under the AFS ASIs oversight for
2 years, but should be able to work for companies that were not under
the AFS ASIs oversight. A second individual commented that airlines
should not be allowed to hire aviation safety inspectors because it is
clearly a conflict of interest and a danger to passengers.
The FAA recognizes the adverse safety effects of “regulatory
capture and conflict of interest when certain former FAA employees
leave the FAA and are employed by an operation for which that person
formerly had oversight duties. However, the FAA is also required to
evaluate the safety benefits of the final rule against potential
regulatory burdens. To achieve the safety benefits of this final rule,
the FAA does not find it necessary to prohibit a former FAA employee
from being hired for positions such as a pilot, flight attendant,
mechanic, training instructor, etc. for an operation for which they
formally had oversight, as long as the former FAA employee does not
represent that operator to the FAA. In addition, the FAA does not find
it necessary to permanently bar a former FAA employee from any job for
any aviation employer after that former FAA employee has completed a 2-
year “cooling off period.
Therefore, in the final rule, these restrictions would only apply
if the individual, in the preceding 2-year period: Directly served as,
or was directly responsible for the oversight of, an AFS ASI; and had
direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspections of the
operator and that individual acts as an agent or a representative of
the operator in any matter before the FAA. The restrictions would not
apply to operators for whose oversight the AFS ASI was not directly
responsible.
[[Page 52233]]
C. Summary of the Final Rule
This final rule will prohibit any person holding a certificate to
conduct operations under parts 121, 125, 133, 135, 137, 141, 142, 145,
or 147 from knowingly employing, or making a contractual arrangement
with, certain individuals to act as an agent or a representative of the
certificate holder in any matter before the FAA under certain
conditions. These restrictions will apply if the individual, in the
preceding 2-year period: directly served as, or was directly
responsible for the oversight of, an AFS ASI; and had direct
responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection of, the operations
of the certificate holder. This final rule will also apply to persons
who own or manage fractional ownership program aircraft that are used
to conduct operations under subpart K of part 91. This final rule will
establish these restrictions to prevent potential organizational
conflicts of interests which could adversely affect aviation safety.
The final rule is identical to the proposal.
II. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 USC. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there is no new requirement for information collection associated with
this final rule.
III. International Compatibility
In keeping with US obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these regulations.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
A. Regulatory Evaluation
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second,
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) requires
agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory changes on small
entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits
agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to
the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing US
standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider international
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis of US
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104-4) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the costs,
benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that include a
Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAAs analysis of
the economic impacts of this rule.
Department of Transportation Order DOT 2100.5 prescribes policies
and procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations.
If the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule
does not warrant a full evaluation, this order permits that a statement
to that effect and the basis for it to be included in the preamble if a
full regulatory evaluation of the cost and benefits is not prepared.
Such a determination has been made for this rule. The reasoning for
this determination follows:
Who Will Be Potentially Affected by This Final Rule
This final rule will affect current and future AFS ASIs and persons
responsible for their oversight who would perform work after the
effective date of the rule for an operator for which they had direct
oversight responsibilities when employed by the FAA. It will also
affect operators that would have hired former FAA employees who had
direct oversight responsibilities for those operators. Finally, this
rule will apply to fractional owners or fractional ownership program
managers who conduct operations under subpart K of part 91.
Potential Benefits and Costs
The final rules primary benefit will be to prevent potential
organizational conflicts of interest. The non-quantifiable benefits
resulting from this effect will be to minimize any potential public
perception that: (1) An AFS ASI could compromise current aviation
safety if that individual were to be promised post-FAA employment by an
operator over which that individual has direct oversight
responsibilities; and (2) a former FAA employee working for an operator
were to attempt to exert undue influence on current FAA employees with
whom that former employee had established close working relationships.
This post-employment prohibition also applies to the more likely case
of former AFS ASIs who would become consultants to the operator. By
prohibiting such relationships, the public will have greater confidence
in the FAAs independence from the aviation industry and in the
integrity of the FAA inspection system. Such benefits from this
increased public confidence in the integrity of the FAA inspection
process cannot be quantified.
The final rule also creates some minor inefficiencies. An operator
can benefit from employing a former AFS ASI who had direct oversight
responsibilities for that operator because that AFS ASI not only knows
more about FAA processes than someone who had not worked for the FAA,
but also, would know more about the operator than other former AFS
ASIs. Further, a former AFS ASI from a specific FSDO or CMO will have
greater knowledge about that office (as well as be better acquainted
with the people in that office) than would a former AFS ASI from a
different office.
For example, some operators may believe that employing a former AFS
ASI who recently had direct oversight responsibilities for their
operations would reduce the time to obtain FAA approval for manual
upgrades and revisions partially due to the personal relationships
between the former AFS ASI and current FAA employees. In such a case,
an operator would be more likely to employ this former AFS ASI than to
employ a former AFS ASI who did not have direct oversight
responsibilities for that operator. Due to the general similarities
among the groups of operators, the potential inefficiencies from
employing a former AFS ASI who did not have direct oversight
responsibilities for that operator will not be significant. Thus, from
the societal point of view, the overall losses to some individual
former FAA inspectors will be largely offset by gains to other former
FAA inspectors or other qualified personnel. Although the final rule
will create income transfers among individuals, at this time, we cannot
quantify this overall loss on an individual basis. From a societal
basis, the safety differential paid for the incremental loss in
knowledge will be very small. We received no public comments
quantifying the amount of losses that any individual will face from
this rule.
The number of former AFS ASIs who leave the FAA varies from year to
year. We used fiscal year 2008 (October 1, 2008, through September 30,
2009), as a representative year-long period to evaluate the number of
potentially
[[Page 52234]]
affected FAA employees. There were a total of 163 AFS ASIs who left FAA
employment during this fiscal year. Fifteen of these were from FAA
headquarters and not specifically assigned to a certificate holder.
These AFS ASIs would not have been affected by the rule. As shown in
Table 1, of the remaining 148 inspectors who left FAA employment, 103
voluntarily retired, 5 retired due to disability, 17 resigned, 1 was
removed, 6 were terminated during their probation period, 2 had their
appointments terminated, and 14 died. Thus, the maximum number of
former inspectors who could have been affected had the rule been in
effect are the 125 non-headquarters personnel who retired (voluntarily
or with disability) or resigned.
TABLE 1–Reasons That the 148 Non-Headquarters Inspectors Left FAA
Employment Between 10/1/08 and 9/30/09
————————————————————————
Number of
Reason for separation inspectors
————————————————————————
VOLUNTARY RETIREMENT……………………………… 103
DISABILITY RETIREMENT…………………………….. 5
RESIGNATION……………………………………… 17
REMOVAL…………………………………………. 1
TERMINATION DURING PROBATION PERIOD………………… 6
TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT………………………… 2
DEATH…………………………………………… 14
—————
TOTAL…………………………………………… 148
————————————————————————
As concluded in the NPRM, we stated that few of these former AFS
ASIs will become involved in post-FAA retirement employment. We further
stated that this overall economic impact will be minimal, with the
potential benefits exceeding the costs. We requested comments on this
economic analysis and received none.
Although the overall economic impact will be minimal, with the
potential benefits exceeding the costs this rule is considered a
“significant regulatory action for other reasons as defined in
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and is “significant as defined
in DOTs Regulatory Policies and Procedures.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes “as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation.
To achieve this principle, agencies are required to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the rationale for
their actions to assure that such proposals are given serious
consideration. The RFA covers a wide-range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the
agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not
required. The certification must include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be
clear.
The final rule will only prevent an AFS ASI and persons responsible
for their oversight from acting as an agent or representative of an
operator before the FAA when those persons had direct oversight
responsibilities for that operator in the preceding two years. The cost
to an operator of being unable to employ a specific individual will be
minimal because other individuals with similar professional
qualifications as those possessed by the former AFS ASI will be
available. Therefore the FAA certifies that this final rule will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.
C. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a “significant regulatory action. The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $140.8 million in lieu of $100
million. This final rule does not contain such a mandate; therefore,
the requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.
V. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this final rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this
action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government, and, therefore, will not have federalism implications.
VI. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded from preparation of an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy
Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has
determined this final rulemaking action qualifies for the categorical
exclusion identified in paragraph 312f and involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
VII. Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution,
or Use
The FAA analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211,
Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). The agency has determined that it
is not a “significant energy action under the executive order and it
is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy.
VIII. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
A. Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of a rulemaking document my be obtained by using
the Internet–
1. Search the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov);
2. Visit the FAAs Regulations and Policies Web page at http://www.faa.gov/
regulations_policies/ or
3. Access the Government Printing Offices Web page at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request (identified by
notice, amendment, or docket number of this rulemaking) to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.
B. Comments Submitted to the Docket
Comments received may be viewed by going to http://www.regulations.gov and
following the online instructions to search the
docket number for this action. Anyone is able to search the electronic
form of all comments received into any of the FAAs dockets by the name
of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the
[[Page 52235]]
comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.).
IX. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act
The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its
jurisdiction. A small entity with questions regarding this document,
may contact its local FAA official, or the person listed under the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT heading at the beginning of the preamble.
To find out more about SBREFA on the Internet, visit
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/sbre_act/.
List of Subjects
14 CFR Part 91
Aircraft, Airmen, Airports, Aviation safety.
14 CFR Part 119
Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety.
14 CFR Part 125
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
14 CFR Part 133
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
14 CFR Part 137
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
14 CFR Part 141
Educational facilities, Schools.
14 CFR Part 142
Educational facilities, Schools.
14 CFR Part 145
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
14 CFR Part 147
Aircraft, Educational facilities, Schools.
The Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration amends Chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 91–GENERAL OPERATING AND FLIGHT RULES
0
1. The authority citation for part 91 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 USC. 106(g), 1155, 40103, 40113, 40120, 44101,
44111, 44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717,
44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506-46507, 47122, 47508, 47528-
47531, articles 12 and 29 of the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (61 Stat. 1180).
0
2. Add Sec. 91.1050 to read as follows:
Sec. 91.1050 Employment of former FAA employees.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no
fractional owner or fractional ownership program manager may knowingly
employ or make a contractual arrangement which permits an individual to
act as an agent or representative of the fractional owner or fractional
ownership program manager in any matter before the Federal Aviation
Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2 years–
(1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
(2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection
of, the operations of the fractional owner or fractional ownership
program manager.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a fractional
owner or fractional ownership program manager in a matter before the
agency if the individual makes any written or oral communication on
behalf of the fractional owner or fractional ownership program manager
to the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with
a particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
(c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a fractional
owner or fractional ownership program manager from knowingly employing
or making a contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act
as an agent or representative of the fractional owner or fractional
ownership program manager in any matter before the Federal Aviation
Administration if the individual was employed by the fractional owner
or fractional ownership program manager before October 21, 2011.
PART 119–CERTIFICATION: AIR CARRIERS AND COMMERCIAL OPERATORS
0
3. The authority citation for part 119 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 USC. 106(g), 1153, 40101, 40102, 40103, 40113,
44105, 44106, 44111, 44701-44717, 44722, 44901, 44903, 44904, 44906,
44912, 44914, 44936, 44938, 46103, 46105.
0
4. Add Sec. 119.73 to read as follows:
Sec. 119.73 Employment of former FAA employees.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no
certificate holder conducting operations under part 121 or 135 of this
chapter may knowingly employ or make a contractual arrangement which
permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation
Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2 years–
(1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
(2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
(c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a certificate
holder from knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement
which permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation
Administration if the individual was employed by the certificate holder
before October 21, 2011.
PART 125–CERTIFICATION AND OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A SEATING
CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF
6,000 POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD SUCH
AIRCRAFT
0
5. The authority citation for part 125 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 USC. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44705, 44710-
44711, 44713, 44716-44717, 44722.
0
6. Add Sec. 125.26 to read as follows:
Sec. 125.26 Employment of former FAA employees.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no
certificate holder may knowingly employ or make a contractual
arrangement which permits
[[Page 52236]]
an individual to act as an agent or representative of the certificate
holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation Administration if the
individual, in the preceding 2 years–
(1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
(2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
(c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a certificate
holder from knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement
which permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation
Administration if the individual was employed by the certificate holder
before October 21, 2011.
PART 133–ROTORCRAFT EXTERNAL-LOAD OPERATIONS
0
7. The authority citation for part 133 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 USC. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702.
0
8. Add Sec. 133.22 to read as follows:
Sec. 133.22 Employment of former FAA employees.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no
certificate holder may knowingly employ or make a contractual
arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent or
representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2
years–
(1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
(2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
(c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a certificate
holder from knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement
which permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation
Administration if the individual was employed by the certificate holder
before October 21, 2011.
PART 137–AGRICULTURAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
0
9. The authority citation for part 137 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 USC. 106(g), 40103, 40113, 44701-44702.
0
10. Add Sec. 137.40 to read as follows:
Sec. 137.40 Employment of former FAA employees.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no
certificate holder may knowingly employ or make a contractual
arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent or
representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2
years–
(1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
(2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
(c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a certificate
holder from knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement
which permits an individual to act as an agent or representative of the
certificate holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation
Administration if the individual was employed by the certificate holder
before October 21, 2011.
PART 141–PILOT SCHOOLS
0
11. The authority citation for part 141 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 USC. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44703, 44707, 44709,
44711, 45102-45103, 45301-45302.
0
12. Add Sec. 141.34 to read as follows:
Sec. 141.34 Employment of former FAA employees.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no holder
of a pilot school certificate or a provisional pilot school certificate
may knowingly employ or make a contractual arrangement which permits an
individual to act as an agent or representative of the certificate
holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation Administration if the
individual, in the preceding 2 years–
(1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
(2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
(c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a holder of a
pilot school certificate or a provisional pilot school certificate from
knowingly employing or making a contractual arrangement which permits
an individual to act as an agent or representative of the certificate
holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation Administration if the
individual was employed by the certificate holder before October 21,
2011.
PART 142–TRAINING CENTERS
0
13. The authority citation for part 142 continues to read as follows:
[[Page 52237]]
Authority: 49 USC. 106(g), 40113, 40119, 44101, 44701-44703,
44705, 44707, 44709-44711, 45102-45103, 45301-45302.
0
14. Add Sec. 142.14 to read as follows:
Sec. 142.14 Employment of former FAA employees.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no holder
of a training center certificate may knowingly employ or make a
contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent
or representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2
years–
(1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
(2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
(c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a holder of a
training center certificate from knowingly employing or making a
contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent
or representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual was employed by the
certificate holder before October 21, 2011.
PART 145–REPAIR STATIONS
0
15. The authority citation for part 145 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 USC. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44707, 44709,
44717.
0
16. Add Sec. 145.160 to read as follows:
Sec. 145.160 Employment of former FAA employees.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no holder
of a repair station certificate may knowingly employ or make a
contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent
or representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the preceding 2
years–
(1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
(2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
(c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a holder of a
repair station certificate from knowingly employing or making a
contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as an agent
or representative of the certificate holder in any matter before the
Federal Aviation Administration if the individual was employed by the
certificate holder before October 21, 2011.
PART 147–AVIATION MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN SCHOOLS
0
17. The authority citation for part 147 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 USC. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44707-44709.
0
18. Add Sec. 147.8 to subpart A to read as follows:
Sec. 147.8 Employment of former FAA employees.
(a) Except as specified in paragraph (c) of this section, no holder
of an aviation maintenance technician certificate may knowingly employ
or make a contractual arrangement which permits an individual to act as
an agent or representative of the certificate holder in any matter
before the Federal Aviation Administration if the individual, in the
preceding 2 years–
(1) Served as, or was directly responsible for the oversight of, a
Flight Standards Service aviation safety inspector; and
(2) Had direct responsibility to inspect, or oversee the inspection
of, the operations of the certificate holder.
(b) For the purpose of this section, an individual shall be
considered to be acting as an agent or representative of a certificate
holder in a matter before the agency if the individual makes any
written or oral communication on behalf of the certificate holder to
the agency (or any of its officers or employees) in connection with a
particular matter, whether or not involving a specific party and
without regard to whether the individual has participated in, or had
responsibility for, the particular matter while serving as a Flight
Standards Service aviation safety inspector.
(c) The provisions of this section do not prohibit a holder of an
aviation maintenance technician school certificate from knowingly
employing or making a contractual arrangement which permits an
individual to act as an agent or representative of the certificate
holder in any matter before the Federal Aviation Administration if the
individual was employed by the certificate holder before October 21,
2011.
Issued in Washington, DC, on August 5, 2011.
J. Randolph Babbitt,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2011-21315 Filed 8-19-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P